As the speculation built that a UK General Election was to be called, those with one eye on UK-EU relations noted that the soon-to-be-confirmed date of 4 July meant that it would potentially be new Prime Minister Keir Starmer that would be hosting the European Political Community summit two weeks later. With the Labour leader the overwhelming favourite to win, this will be a great opportunity to introduce himself to fellow continental leaders.
After such a quick start, however, this timing also has a quite opposing implication – a July election coming so soon after that of the EU means that Labour cannot be quickly heading to Brussels to deepen relations as there will not be a fully formed Commission to speak with. While some topics such as security cannot wait and Labour’s potential Foreign Secretary David Lammy wants to move quickly to strengthen ties, in general it is likely to be into 2025 before UK Ministers will find appropriate counterparts able to talk in detail.
Envisaged as a balancing act between stakeholder demands and fears of reopening Brexit battles, Labour’s stated plans for the EU are initially relatively modest. Stated goals of a veterinary agreement, the much tougher ask of recognition of professional qualifications, and support for touring artist visas are not however the definite limit of ambitions. Given the desire for a renewed industrial strategy and green deal, there will definitely be further discussions such as the extent of regulatory alignment including with measures such as carbon border pricing, mutual recognition of conformity assessments, and joining the Pan-Euro-Med convention on Rules of Origin.
New Ministers can be expected to prioritise engagement with Brussels and EU capitals far more than their predecessors. Suggestions of cooperation will not be limited to security, with energy and global economic affairs the next obvious candidates. This of course will come on top of the existing drumbeat of negotiations which is already due to encompass fisheries and data, as well as the regular working level meetings and the 2026 review of implementation associated with them. One big change will be that Labour activists and other key stakeholders such as business and trade unions will be pushing the government to go further with the EU, rather than acting as a restraint, though much media will still be rather less than supportive.
Thinking of the political cycle and negotiating timescales, Labour will be wanting to show significant progress by 2027, which means getting serious negotiations underway by the Autumn of 2025. What a July election now means is the opportunity for a new government to take a few months ahead of significant EU engagement to think about how to do this far better than previous administrations.
There are two areas in particular where the UK needs to improve significantly with regard to the EU. First is to be far clearer internally and publicly on objectives and red lines, in a way that still leaves room for agreements. Not rejoining a customs union or single market are known red lines, but these will need to be supplemented by deeper thinking on broad issues such as alignment and mobility, where there will be limits, but setting them too narrowly will risk any deals, and in the case of the former will also read across to trade talks with Switzerland and Turkey. What is actually the specific ask in areas like SPS is also not currently known, as to whether this should be frictionless trade or reduced alignment.
Second area for improvement is in understanding that the UK-EU relationship is a multi-level multi-subject engagement which is carried out across government and by an extensive range of stakeholders. Not just one of the world’s trade flows, this is also a case of shared geography with all that this implies, and consider like-mindedness. Rather than assume this can all be centralised into one Minister, Labour would ideally revamp Cabinet Office coordination under a lead Cabinet Minister or ‘political sherpa’ who would be the direct counterpart of the relevant EU Commissioner. Individual negotiations would then be carried out by specialist team whether in trade or agriculture, supported always by the range of UK organisations who have ties with their European counterparts in a Team UK approach.
Such a stylistic change should also be reflected in the overall UK-EU relationship, where Labour should be seeking a significant thickening to the extent that inevitable setbacks in one area of talks do not affect ongoing cooperation elsewhere. There is no one-size-fits-all model in the relationship already, indeed already there are a variety of structures, and this should be embraced. Ministers and senior officials should though certainly be expecting to travel to Brussels far more, starting with the Prime Minister in a summit which would help to unlock such deeper cooperation between their key teams. From this would also come steadily the increased level of trust that is needed to make significant progress.
There is appetite but caution in the EU for such an approach. Member States are keen to cooperate as long as there are no more short-sighted attempts to play them off against a Commission which will continue to control relations. There are plenty of supportive voices for the UK inside those structures, though others who recall the horrors of previous UK negotiations. EU asks on youth mobility are already known and have to be treated with more respect by a new government, even if they are the opening basis to a discussion not the final result. There will be plenty of other asks, and one of the hallmarks of an improving relationship will be that these are shared rather than just belonging to one side or others.
Change shouldn’t just be on the UK side either. Dealing with a hostile but naïve UK government has rendered the Commission’s messaging simplistic in the extreme, usually starting by saying no. That would not be appropriate for a new administration seeking better ties, and for example on SPS the EU has de facto currently ruled out both potential options for a deal, with frictionless trade seen as cherry picking, and reduced barriers seen as not possible for such a close partner. That is not a sensible position, not least as a UK sharing many policy challenges such as growth under a new friendly government may be the closest partner Brussels could possibly find.
For those of us who have spent time in Brussels and London in recent years, there is a renewed sense of opportunity, but also some fear that renewed impetus could soon be frittered away by repeating some of the same mistakes of the past. In particular, there should be no rush to a negotiation that inevitably focuses on differences, but rather we need to start by building the political structures to create a cooperation that works for both. To an extent, the timing of the UK election now forces this to a degree, and is thus extremely welcome.