There is a small but growing awareness in London political circles that Brussels sets the terms for UK-EU engagement. From this is coming a slow dawning that a closer relationship allowing the removal of trade barriers is dependent on its terms, which are all about pounds, people, and positivity – as in the UK making financial contributions, accepting movement of EU nationals, and sounding like it cares about European solidarity.
What may seem obvious to some could actually see a turning point after over ten years of sterile UK debate. Veteran Brexit watchers did of course always know that Brussels matters, and very specifically that city much more than Paris or Berlin for EU-third country relations. Their influence was however rather limited by governments that really did not want to listen to experts because they thought they knew better.
Recall back in the early days after the Brexit referendum when the then government claimed to hold all the cards. Those cards don’t seem to have existed.
Then there were the repeated threats while Boris Johnson was Prime Minister, that the EU correctly judged to be empty. Sure enough, he would not walk away without a deal given multinational business would then do similar from the UK.
Even the more emollient Rishi Sunak took some convincing that breaking Withdrawal Agreement commitments with regard to Northern Ireland was not in fact something the UK could do painlessly. Ultimately EU and US pressure was brought to bear such that CPTPP accession would have been blocked without the Windsor Framework.
Blindness to basic Brexit realities is not confined to those that supported leaving the EU. Demands for a Customs Union to remove most trade barriers with no reciprocal commitments from the UK was the classic cakeism, as is this government’s similar idea of widespread alignment that has been rejected several times by the EU. Those thinking rejoining would be easy are also guilty of wishful thinking.
Thus, the current reset wasn’t mostly about a new UK government, though obviously they wanted to deliver their manifesto of closer ties, but the common understanding being broadly the limit of what the EU would offer without greater UK commitment on movement of people in particular. Continued hesitation on the part of the UK government to accept the EU’s youth mobility demands is thus more than just negotiation, but rather symbolic of why the Brussels collective has never fully trusted its former member.
This negotiation to also align rules on SPS and emissions trading schemes is however essential in rebuilding UK-EU relations, a first demonstration of the limits that a friendly UK government faces. That EU Member States delayed the agreement of a mandate over financial contributions was particularly revealing of what will be required to go further.
What follows is that the UK can choose the broad depth of its chosen relationship, but the EU will shape the exact balance from this point, and clever negotiating stunts will not change that. Thus whether it is a relationship based on a Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union, or Single Market it will be about what fits with the EU approach. In particular, UK demands to separate trade from wider responsibilities around people or money will not be acceptable, and security cooperation will not change that welcome as it is.
There are signs that the UK public understand the limits of wishful thinking. Unfortunately UK politics has remained rather stunted in large part because successive governments wrongly believe that international trade negotiations are all about secret bargains. Conservative and Reform Party Brexit backers offering only tired failed old generalisms about trade and regulatory freedoms hardly help.
The limits all middle powers face when it comes to independent regulation or trade policy, even more for those that are the neighbours of the largest players, are difficult for UK politicians to accept. Such an example of more general UK political naivety will probably also mean the next substantive stage of UK-EU relations takes time to reach fruition – though in the shorter-term before the next election limited agreements around economic security are an obvious stopgap.
As well as understanding the limitations of UK choice, MPs supportive of closer ties also have to realise that Brexit is widely seen in Europe as the first major development in this wave of national populism. Any significant reverse will require the UK to demonstrate it has learnt the importance of solidarity, and that will almost certainly be through UK leaders going to Brussels and speaking positively about the EU. Taking on the UK media in this way is not a step most politicians will want to take, but otherwise the spectre of further UK zig-zagging on commitment will loom large.
Ironically the right tone was demonstrated by Boris Johnson, whose Brussels upbringing probably imbued its values more than he would like to admit, over Ukraine. His invocation of European togetherness echoed by successors along with the antics of President Trump help to put the EU in the mood to listen to London even if it knows this may be politically premature for London. They know that Europe’s security and prosperity is significantly boosted by strong UK relations.
UK politicians prepared to draw a vision for Europe in today’s circumstances of challenges from both west and east will be heard with interest, not least if they also understand this to be part of an application process for whatever closer ties are suggested. This then comes back to the significance of the moment that is Westminster finally starting to understand how power lies in EU-third country relations.
UK choices with regard to the EU were never unlimited, and in the future are probably likely to come down to the current relationship softened at the margins, some variant of a Swiss-style relationship balancing close integration with a small amount of independence in a few hand-picked areas, or membership.
Trade negotiations are generally about testing red lines of each party to find where the common ground lies. After ten years the UK may finally be understanding the EU position, and now needs the political debate on its own long-term future that has never properly happened because it was assumed some special arrangements could be made.
Taking such cakeism off the agenda should be a significant new development, putting back into UK politics the only important question that matters with regard to the EU, does it want to be in, close, or more distant.