For over a year now Viktor Orbán has been on the back foot. His once bulletproof Fidesz is now trailing to a newcomer, Tisza, led by a Péter Magyar, a former underling. With the election due later this week this may finally result in the defeat of the self-styled ‘illiberal’ democrat. For many in Hungary and across the EU this would be a great sigh of relief: for the former it reignites long subdued hope of change, while for the latter it would be the removal of the single biggest thorn on its side. In Brussels, the hopes are firmly that a Péter Magyar win will be a reset in Hungary-EU relations, a return to the fold of a disproportionately influential member state. A win for “rational politics” against the “illiberal right.”
However, it may be too soon to celebrate. For Orbán may be trailing in the polls, but the election game is being played on his terms. He also knows his opponent well, with Magyar being a product of the system. It is easy, in this light, for Fidesz campaigners to project an image of a repentant contender, who has stumbled upon a moral conscious and now wants to transform the system he has grew out of. This is in fact the political origin story of Orbán himself, with Fidesz itself starting off as a “radical” pro-western liberal party.
For his part, Magyar has stressed his desired to work ‘for Hungary within the EU’, and as such it is expected by many in Europe that he will be a cooperative partner. Given the intricacies of Hungary of politics, however, this may be a rather far-fetched hope. With years of anti-EU and anti-international rhetoric perpetuated by Fidesz, and a press which it controls, Magyar would have to work in an environment that is highly resistant to radical change. How different will a Péter Magyar and Tisza Hungary thus be?
Tisza’s Manifesto
Perhaps the first thing to say is that it will be different. Orbán has been in power since 2010 and, if he’s defeated, he won’t be able to control the regime of corruption, cronyism, and manufactured subordination he has built. It is therefore a chance for Hungary to begin afresh with new faces and leaders that will come with a mandate for change and to revive an economy and institutions that have become sclerotic under Orbán.[i]
Second, whilst being a former insider, Magyar was not a loyalist nor a favoured one in the manner that his ex-wife (the former Justice Minister, Judit Varga) was. He is thought to have always been his own man in a way, with his own vision of how to operate once in power. This has been implanted in the Tisza corps, with the party by all means a one man show.
Magyar and Tisza remain coy on how they will differ from Fidesz in practice. Many uncertainties remain over the policies a new government would pursue and how it would improve EU relations—especially given voter’s poor perceptions of it. While its short track record in the European parliament does not give much clarity either. The manifesto of Tisza is not helping much to understand future directions as it fails to set a clear line of policy that the party will take once in government. It is by all means a broad-church coalition of anti-Orbánism, with a populist core. It claims to fight for an all-spectrum government, of no divide between left, centre, and right. Just Hungarians taking back their destiny after almost two decades in the abyss, and walking hand-in-hand toward a new future.
Besides the declaration that ‘Hungary’s future belongs in Europe’ there is little to deduce as far as cooperation with the EU is concerned.
Political Realities
One can understand the absence of clear policy for the moment. For one, Orbán is a deep-rooted incumbent with a system setup for himself—he also has a track record of snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. Therefore, any opposition leader has to walk on eggshells as far as revealing their agenda goes.
Secondly, Orbán has always been a master of the media. From the outset of his political career to his time in the opposition, and throughout his long second term since 2010, he has been constantly adapting to new forms of communication. The only time he had failed at it was during his first term between 1998 and 2002, a large part of why he then lost. As he put it himself, he lost control of the narrative. Since then, it has been his personal vendetta to take full control of the media and the press, and he has succeeded in doing so. Almost every prominent newspaper, news channel, and radio station was taken over by him (through friends of course). Pro-opposition papers or any media with differing views have been attacked, obstructed, stunted, and some completely quashed. Hungarian publications bore the brunt of this attack, but several international ones came under attack as well, most notably RTL (owned by the German Bertelsmann).
Equally, public education has been mismanaged and underfunded under Orbán, whilst academic freedom has been severely obstructed. Many have heard of the attack on the Central European University, which has since all but left Budapest, but overall academic freedom and the barter of ideas outside of the government ideology remains restricted.
After 16 years of onslaught, independent press (and education broadly) is wholly atrophied in Hungary, especially outside of Budapest. As such you have a large mass of voters who have long been fed a twisted view of the world. These factors will undoubtedly affect the outcome of an election and anyone aiming to win an election would thus have to pander to this media climate.[ii]
Finally, there are the persistent nationalistic elements in Hungary’s politics that Orbán has kept simmering during his time in government – including the “sovereignty threat” of the EU, migration and the “culture war”, or ethnic minorities like the Roma. It thus maintains an inward-looking political culture. Hungary’s politics since 1989 has been characterised by sharp peaks, troughs, and jolts. There hasn’t been a bipartisan constructive program that the winner of each election carries on, rather a constant power battle. Undo, re-do. This has made it easy for a charismatic leader (as was Orbán) to stir-up sentiments and rise to power while less impassioned goal-oriented politicians haven’t found it easy.[iii] A familiar story in many parts of the world.
National questions linked to the previous century are still large on the electoral agenda with those Hungarians once carved out of their homeland into neighbouring states like Romania having an impact on the outcome. For his part, Orbán has long courted these voters, being the largest champion of their enfranchisement during his opposition days and ultimately granting it during early return in 2012.
Any politician anywhere can be expected to change posture on account of voter pressure, and in the case of Hungary, perhaps more so. One can thus pessimistically imagine the same soundwaves crying out from another speaker, even with a change of guard. With Orbán in the wings as an opposition leader and one still in control of the media, the risk remains.
Obviously, this is a challenge to Magyar’s ability to change things once in power. But even if the election campaign is being played on Orbán’s sensationalist terms, Magyar is successfully playing it. The tide of change is also clearly on the challenger’s side, with many seeing this election as a glad vote against Orbán rather than a vote for his opponent per se. The upside of this is a broad mandate for change, which looks ever more likely as the clock ticks toward election day. Regardless, it will be a long and enduring project to change Hungarian politics.
A Welcome Change
Despite reservations, improvements may still come fast also on the EU front. Even in the possible scenario that leadership change does not bring about a more cooperative Hungary, there is no doubt that a Magyar government will be better for the EU and the world at large. Beyond openly undermining EU positions and blatant disregard for international law, Orbán is an active political threat. Not just in what he represents, but the force and persistence with which he is able to do so.
Russian support for his election campaign is clearly documented, as is his open support for them. Equally bad is the Trump administration’s declaration that his victory is part of the US national interest. For possible implications one can look to Brazil. There the US violated Brazil’s sovereignty, threatening its judicial system by sanctioning its supreme court justice, Alexandre de Moraes (and his family), simply for upholding the law and launching an outlandish tariff war against the country on account of this.[iv] One can only hope that their outlandish and frankly embarrassing canvass for Orbán shall end in vain.
If Orbán loses the EU will also see the departure of the ringleader of anti-Brusselsism and a beacon of the “illiberal” right around the globe. Orbán’s long reign has given him a leadership position among those on the new right who seeks to exploit the culture wars and make politics a battle of falsities and deceit. We don’t know yet exactly what politics that Magyar will represent, but seeing the back of Orbán will be a welcome change in European politics.
[i] Looking at Freedom House’s democracy indicators, Hungary is by some margin the lowest scoring of the EU27 at 69/100. 25 out of 27 score in the 80-100 range, most at or above 90, with only Bulgaria coming close to Hungary at 74/100. It’s score for free and fair elections has also fallen to 2/4 from the maximum of 4/4 in 2013, reflecting Orbán’s gerrymandering among other violations. Its ‘electoral process’ score has equally fallen from a maximum of 12/12 to 7/12. Most crucially, its ‘independent judiciary’ has remained at 2/4 throughout his second reign, and is reflective of his placement of favourable judges, and the early retiring of several many justices who were “obstacles”.
[ii] See Paul Lendvai’s “Orbán: Europe’s New Strongman” for a holistic account of Orbán’s subordination of the media, and utilisation of public funds to develop a crony-controlled private sector.
[iii] See Zsuzsanna Szelényi’s “Tainted Democracy: Viktor Orbán and the Subversion of Hungary” for a thorough account of Orban’s populist exploits and his deconstruction of the state.