EU-Russia Trade Since the Start of the War

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered one of the sharpest geopolitical realignments in modern trade history. The European Union, historically dependent on Russian energy, pledged to sever this critical vulnerability. Three years later, updated trade data offers a rare opportunity to assess whether political commitments have translated into economic reality.

EU Trade with Russia

EU imports from Russia have fallen by 91 per cent, from €20.5 billion to €1.7 billion per month in constant prices, driven by a sharp post-invasion fall between March 2022 and 2023, followed by a steady decline. EU exports to Russia have also fallen, though less dramatically, dropping 75 per cent from €7.1 billion to €1.8 billion per month, in constant prices. The export trajectory has been more volatile and, tellingly, has remained essentially flat over the past year (December 2024 to December 2025), even as imports have continued their downward trend (Figure 1). Overall, trade linkages between the EU and Russia have been reduced sharply. In 2022, Russia was the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner, behind the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Switzerland. By 2025, Russia had fallen to 19^th place.

Figure 1: EU import and export values from Russia (January 2022 – December 2025, constant prices) Source: Eurostat, Author’s Calculations.

The strong reduction in EU-Russia trade has been a collective effort. Between 2022 and 2025, every member state reduced imports from Russia. However, the scale and speed varied considerably (Figure 2). In absolute terms, the largest economies bore the heaviest burden. Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, and France accounted for the bulk of the reduction. Yet in relative terms, smaller economies experienced the largest proportional declines – Luxembourg cut imports by 100 per cent, Cyprus by 98 per cent, and Romania by 96 per cent. Germany stands out for achieving both. Its €24 billion reduction in imports represents a 97 per cent decline, a reflection of how deeply embedded Russian goods, particularly energy, had become in its supply chains. Not all member states moved at the same pace. Malta, Slovakia, and Hungary recorded the smallest reductions – 26, 55, 57 per cent respectively.

Figure 2: Change in EU member state imports from Russia (2022-2025, € million)Source: Eurostat, Author’s Calculations. Note: All values are at constant prices.

The export picture is more complex. Whilst most member states reduced shipments to Russia between 2022 and 2025, a handful – Slovenia, Croatia, Ireland and Sweden – recorded small increases (Figure 3). Germany once again dominates in absolute terms, cutting exports by €6.2 billion – more than three times Poland’s €2.1 billion reduction, the second largest. Finland and Lithuania also achieved steep cuts of 85 per cent each, which is significant given their previous commercial ties with Russia.

Figure 3: Change in EU member state exports to Russia (2022-2025, € million)Source: Eurostat, Author’s Calculations. Note: All values are at constant prices.

Sectoral Differences

The sectoral breakdown reveals where decoupling has been most complete (Figure 4). At one extreme, the EU has virtually eliminated imports of textiles, plastics, and wood from Russia, with a 99 per cent reduction between 2022 and 2025. Chemicals and miscellaneous manufactured articles followed closely, falling 94 and 93 per cent respectively. Together, these three sectors accounted for a quarter of EU imports from Russia in 2022, making their near-total withdrawal economically significant. The agricultural and beverages sector, which saw the lowest decline, still saw a relatively large percentage decrease of 72 per cent. Services fell by 78 per cent, suggesting either continued demand for specific Russian expertise or the difficulty of severing intangible trade flows. The middle ground was occupied by minerals and fuels (87 per cent), machinery and vehicles (83 per cent), and stone, glass, and metals (78 per cent) – all substantial reductions, but short of the near-complete break seen in manufactured goods.

Figure 4: Percentage decrease in EU imports from Russia by sectoral categories (2022-2025)Source: Eurostat, Author’s Calculations. Note: All values are at constant prices. The sectoral categories were created by aggregating the existing product categorisation by the CPA.

The export picture reveals a more partial decoupling (Figure 5). Services saw the steepest decline at 87 per cent, followed closely by machinery and vehicles at 85 per cent – indicating the impact of export restrictions on high-technology goods and intangible trade. Minerals and fuels fell by 79 per cent and stone, glass, and metals fell by 75 per cent, marking a clear break but far short of the near-total withdrawal seen in EU imports. At the other end, agriculture and beverages declined by just 34 per cent – the smallest reduction of any sector and barely half of the fall in machinery exports. Miscellaneous manufactured articles (62 per cent), textile, plastics, and wood (59 per cent), and chemicals (36 per cent) clustered in the middle. Notably, no sector saw reductions exceeding 90 per cent, in stark contrast to the import side where three sectors virtually disappeared.

Figure 5: Percentage decrease in EU exports to Russia by sectoral categories (2022-2025)Source: Eurostat, Author’s Calculations. Note: All values are at constant prices.

High-Dependency Products

A previous ECIPE blog, ‘Russia’s Import Dependency Problem’ identified ten product categories where the EU was heavily reliant on Russian imports in 2021. Table 1 tracks what happened to some of these dependencies between 2022 and 2025. Semi-finished iron products fell from €2.2 billion to €1.3 billion, nickel mattes from €1.7 billion to €518 million, ferrous products from €681 million to €142 million, vanadium oxide from €115 million to €62 million. Natural calcium phosphates saw an increase from €65 million to €108 million.

Table 1: EU imports from Russia of dependent products (2022 and 2025)Source: Eurostat, Author’s Calculations. Note: All values are at constant prices.

Conclusion

Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the economic decoupling between the European Union and Russia has been profound and instructive. The data reveals a stark severance of ties, with EU imports from Russia falling by 91 per cent, from a pre-war level of €20.5 billion to just €1.7 billion per month and EU exports to Russia dropping by 75 per cent from €7.1 billion to €1.8 billion per month.

The most dramatic reductions in trade occurred within the first 12 to 18 months of the conflict. However, the subsequent plateau in both import and export figures since September 2024 suggests that the process of economic decoupling has encountered a practical floor.

Ultimately, the EU-Russia trade data offers a powerful lesson in the geopolitics of trade. It demonstrates that even deeply entrenched economic dependencies, particularly in strategic sectors like energy, can be broken within a remarkably short timeframe when sufficient political will is applied. Yet, it also underscores the inherent limits of economic decoupling, revealing a resilient baseline of economic interaction that persists even in the face of significant political pressure.