Why has New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani established a working relationship with Trump better than that of any EU leader? Are European diplomatic skills so atrophied after eighty years of successful collaboration that they are now unable to navigate a challenging U.S. environment?
First, we should understand why that environment has become so challenging. The U.S. attack on Iran brings many of the U.S.-Europe differences to the surface, but we saw these themes at the Munich Security Conference, and even earlier with Trump’s Greenland initiative. With the wisdom of hindsight, we can see that Greenland was not just about Greenland and that Europe no longer has the relationship with the U.S. that it had enjoyed across several generations of leaders. Neither Greenland, Munich, nor Iran caused this shift, but they certainly contributed to and illuminated it. Greenland is a good place to start. Trump was asking Americans and Europeans to ignore the logic of his initiative, the security dimension, history, and law – and to reduce the United States to an expansionist power. More troubling than the policy itself was the premise that the relationship with Europe was of little value – and therefore there was no downside in trying to shoplift an island. In sum, the two unsettling aspects of the deterioration are that Trump sees no problem associated with it and that Europe does not have a response.
So the issue is not Greenland (or Munich or Iran) per se. The issue is Trumpist nationalism combined with European complacency and inertia. At the risk of blaming the victim, where was Europe as this calamity unfolded? Why is Vladimir Putin the only leader in Europe able to establish a rapport with Donald Trump? (Yes, those keeping score will also cite Orban, but is this more of an example of Putin’s ability to cultivate Trump or has Orban successfully generated a profile in the Trump Administration?) Macron and Merz can get a polite audience. Starmer is treated with disdain, with Trump publicly criticising the UK’s Chagos Island policy and separately noting it had “not been helpful” regarding the U.S. attack on Iran. European political leaders tend to be competent parliamentary managers who rise as staid, broadly acceptable rationalists. Trump is a horse of a different colour, to put it mildly. He has a famously difficult personality and he might well deserve a Nobel Prize for self-absorption, but is the job of a European leader to interact with pleasant people only or is it to advance the national interest? It seems Putin understood the job better than other European leaders did.
Why is there no European financier, industrialist, or “tech bro” with reach into Trump’s family or inner circle? More troubling, why is there no European nation with a public diplomacy program in the U.S. designed for the Trump moment? Trump has taken a stab at dismantling what may be the most successful security architecture in human history, and Europe’s response is to invite dignitaries to the national day celebrations at their embassies. Trump is now in his sixth year as president and European nations’ public diplomacy programs still assume Eisenhower is in office. Note to Europe: Please switch from decaf.
It seems the European disdain for Trump has led to paralysis. It is not just that his moves are viewed as destructive and gratuitous, Trump’s moves can be confounding. European public diplomacy is unable to adjust to an era of populism, social media, shock value, and contrarian personalities.
What if confounding were the goal? We see this pattern in Trump’s public confrontations. Trump relishes being audacious – sometimes offensive. The other party is shocked and incredulous, even outraged. Trump is forceful and is taking the initiative. The other party is reactive and, in this case, remote as well. Trump is here and now. Ignore that logic for a moment, and look at the theatrics. Trump dominates the stage, while Europe appears slow, reactive, complaining and –unfortunately – boring. Trump acts as if he is in a reality TV show and Europe acts as if it is presenting a proposal to the European Parliament on sunflower-oil price stabilisation. Trump must be in the right and Europe must be in the wrong. By the way, is Denmark the place with the windmills or the place with Hamlet?
It seems that Trump has as much disdain for Europe as Europe has for him. Trump’s team couched the problem in policy terms at Munich, but is it more of a personal or political affair for Trump, serving as a metaphor for power and prestige, as well as providing him the opportunity to abuse Europe for snubbing his Nobel Prize aspirations?
The good news is that Europe is starting to rise to the moment. Europe has maintained support for Ukraine after the U.S. cutoff. The larger European powers have agreed to increase their defence spending, and Europe has shown diplomatic and military support for Denmark. There is some modest cooperation on Iran. The bad news is that in the U.S., Europe is fighting only one of two fights. It needs to add the battle of public diplomacy to its battle of policy rebuttal.
Europe cannot ignore the logic, the security dimension, history, and law, but it should not fixate on these merits. Europe needs to engage the American public directly. We are in a People-to-People communications era and Europe is following a Government-to-Government strategy. As we saw with Trump’s efforts to bully the Fed, or with the recent Kristi Noem resignation, when Trump sees a domestic political cost for his behaviour, he is open to changing his ways.
Europe needs an outreach campaign in the U.S., working with the themes and constituencies to reinforce America’s best instincts that a trans-Atlantic deterioration is enormously harmful to U.S. security interests. A few examples:
- Who are your influencers? Every European country has social media stars with audiences vastly larger than the foreign ministry’s audience. Only a portion of these might be helpful, but that would still represent a significant increase in reach in the U.S.
- We are military allies. Why not bring retired Chiefs of Staff to discuss European defence themes, the Ukraine War, or any other topic? What about veterans from Afghanistan?
- Americans are film buffs. What is the most important documentary or dramatised version of significant historical moments such as World War II? Film festivals, graduate schools, and community gatherings should have this material available.
- Who are the best economists, whether in banking or academia? By best, I mean in American terms, most telegenic. They need to talk with American audiences about topics such as the Euro and digital finance. How does Europe view Bitcoin? What is the Fed likely to do about interest rates?
- What about the literary world and sports? Who are the most prominent European authors with an American constituency and what are they doing this weekend? Who are the European Olympic heroes who might have resonance in the U.S.?
Add to this list as you please. The point is that Europe needs to lead a conversation in the U.S. Those of us who came to political maturity during the Cold War when the Atlantic Alliance was the central pillar of American security are leaving the scene, along with our steadfast belief that European friendship and reliability has been a blessing and not a cost. Americans who have only known Europe since the end of the Cold War are more likely to see Europe as bureaucratic, slow-growth, sanctimonious, and hostile to innovation. Let’s remind the American public that there is considerable benefit in behaving as a rules-based nation. There is value in the mutual respect, cooperation, and yes, friendship, that has characterised U.S.-Europe relations for over 80 years. And that the best way of maintaining a friendship is to be worthy of friendship.
Diplomatic logic alone won’t carry the day; Europe needs to win on the stage, not just on paper. Better make that latte a double.
Mr. Lavin’s observations and analysis are apt as usual. The aging out of the Cold War generation will make a very big impact sooner rather than later.